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THE

RI

GUT

This is a subject
importance and attract

TO

PRI

VACY.

that has just begun to assume
attention.

discussed and that very recently.

It

has been little

In

Vol.

IV.,

1890,

of the Harvard Law Review for December,

was very ably supported by Samuel D. Warrier
Braridies.

No.

5,

this right
and Louis D.

And it was also touched upon in the July

number of Scribners Nagazine for 1890,
at pages 65-67.

by E. L.

From both of these articles

Godkin

I have

received very material assistance, especially from the
article in the Harvard Law Review.

There is one adjudi-

cated case bearing directly ori this right, Schuyler v
Curtis, 15 N. Y. Supp. 787, of which more anon.
Although this right has never been recognized
judicially until recently, that is as the right
to privacy, it may be said to have been admitted

irider fictions arid ivn connection with uther subjects.
is

The nature of this right

so tue

piysical,

arid,

is it affects simply the ease and comfort of the individuai,

his happinessarid peace

arid his s-nse of

of mind,

security, a great deal of diffic"lty is to be expeoted
C
at
entirety
in its
in getting the courts to recognize it
once.

They must adopt it piece by piece, particle by
halting at times,

particle,

nizing it fully.

but 1 think,

finally,

The same difficulties are

recog-

to be met

with in this case as irn the treatment of any new subject
Judges are very reluctant to depart from their accustomed routine

and deal

vith new subjects,

requiring differ-

ent principles and rules to govern them.
The right to privacy, as it is to be treated in
this discussion, means:

the right that a person has

keep to himself his affairs

to

and relationsthat are of a

purely private natureand do not affect materially his
relations with persons with whom he is to deal;
case he is a public officer, or a candidate
officedo

not tend to irmftr

arid ability to discharge
imposed upon him.

the people

or in

for such

of his capacity

the duties that are, or may be,

It is the right as Judge eooLey says

in his work on Torts, 2nd. ed.p 29,

"to be let alone".

'That can be of more valu,. to a man than a sense of security in his person, property and private affairs?
No mar can do as well, feel as well, or be of much valu.
to the community, when he is unhappy.

Can a man be happy

and contenited with life, when he knows that his domestic
relations, his private dealings, and his general life,
no matter how good and virtuous these may be,are laid
bare to the scrutiny and criticism of the public? There
are a few, who are so desirious of publicity, that they
will even go so far as to commit a crime in order that
they may secure notoriety;

that they may have their

names and accomplishments, on the lips and irn the minds
of men.

But this class of people is comparatively small

and of little importance.

The great majority of men

desire quietude, peace and comfort, and fr-:edo!. from
criticism. July No. Scribners Magazine.

("The Rights of

the Citizen ", by E. L. Godkin, pp. 65-67)
The scrutinizing eye and bare faced effrontery of
the press, in seeking every opportunity of giving some
news, or revealing something that may gratify some morbid
taste; new inventions una mechanical devices, particularly
I

that of the camera, have long made it apparent that
there ought to be

some restraint in their exercise.

Not only does it
have

give pain to the individual to

his private affairs and

made public;
at large.

his domestic relations

but it lowers the morality of the people

Every fresh bit of gossip and

pleases the taste of

some,

scandal

and by a continuous display

to the public view secures new followers.

So that minds

that are capable of other and better things are diverted
from their usual course, arid follow this spicy and scandalous rievs, much to their detriment.

The nature of the

news, appealing as it does to the weak side of human
nature,

makes it more interesting arid,

detrimental

individual being shown,
law recognize it?

In

more

to the public norality.

The value of this righttr

statute on

therefore,

the colmrunit

the question then is,

arid to the
Does the

Will it protect it? As there is no

this subject, we must search the common law.

searching this we find no decision directly in

point,

but the elasticityand continuous g:'owth of the common
law to cover new subjects;
to adapt itself
civilization;

to deai

with new inventions;

to the varying and ever advancing
gives us hopes that it

wililextend

its

protecting
The

folds

and cover this right.

common law is

policy of the people,

nothing more or let,
as strengthened

thau the
to

arid adapted

practical use 'y usage, which is the evidence and proof
of its

general

fitness

and common convenience. (Nor ay

Plane Co. V Boston & the R. R. Co.,

I Gray 267.)

Were

this not so, any new invention, any new business, as rail
would be practically

roads, telegraphs and the like,
without any law to govern them,
vision had been made.

untii

pro

some statutory

It would be ve -y difficult,

almost impossible,to construct a statute that would
govern the new invention or business in all
while

its detailsi

the common law composed of a very few general

ciples,

that are

elastic

and capable of adaptingt

selces to any state of affairs

prin

them-

that fi-ll within its

domain, will be applicable.
From these general rules the

tribunal forris partic-

ular rules that will apply more specifically to the subject in hand;

so that, finally, the new subject will

have a law of its

own governed by rules

that belong to

it alone.
What was policy to the people

centuries

ago,

4k

in

the then crude

times,

cannot be said to be policy now

The people ot a necessity have adopted a new policy.They
live and conduct

They have apopted new rules.
selves

by, the common

absurdity.

in

affairs

their

a different

manner.

To go back and govern our-

law of that time,

would be an

I do not claim that all the rules of the ear

ly common law should be abolished;;on the other hand,
many of them will apply to day, but only those that are
adapted to our changed position and circumstances.
to this right, did not arise at

Controversies, as

early common law because it was not violated to any extent.

It was not violated because there were no such

oppotunities as we have to-day.
of little importance;

the crown restricted their publi-

cation and circulation;

known.

The newspapers were

the art

of photography was un-

As the wrong in the violauion of this right

consists of the injury to the feelings

of the party,

if he never hears of the violation of this right, he is

not injured.

There w-s of course some gossip and dis-

cussion of the private affairs of people in the early
times, but the pevson gossiped about seldom knew of the
was not injured.
gossip an4consequently
t

As long as the

gossip coritinuea

to be by w,.rd of mouth,

it

was

rarely

brought to the persons knowledge. (Scribners Miagazine,
July No. 1890, p 66.)
was not violated

So at early common law this right

to any great extent.

2ut now that the

newspapers devote many colums to such gossip, the person
sees

it

and is

meets knows

unde:

of his various

private affairs.
Even if

the impression
little

that everyone he

indiscretions

and his

(Scribners Magazine, July No. 1890. p 66 )

the attempt to protect

made, the courts would have failed

this right had been
to grant relief;

because in early times the common law judges became the
slaves of precedent.

They came to be so r-igid in

their

dealings with cases, that they would not recognize any
new principles.

In

fact the common law,

instead of be-

ing unwritten came virtually to be written.

The judges

were as unable to depart from their old rutsand take
cognizance of new principles, as if the common law had
been reduced to a statute.
Vol.

I,

(See Pomeroys

Eq.

Juris.

-# 16.)

This state of affairs could not exist for any great
length of time,

so the court of equity was

institu~edhavir,

justice and reason.

foundation

as its

equity continued
The commorn

as a seperate

tribunal

for some

time.

law judges)gradually givinEg up their techbeean to take cognizance

riicalities,

The court of

of the right

and

wrong in

a case5

finally,

th- court of equity as a seperate tribunal,

has ceased

(Por.

to exist

of this country.

in

Eq. Juris. Vol.l.,

England

Al1?.)until,

anid iri most of the States

During this condition of the early

courts it would have been very difficult to have the
courts recognize this principle, doubly so because of
its metaphysical character;but rnow the courts recognize
the fact that only a part of maris enjoyment of life lies
in

material things.
Considering the state of affairs in early times,

we

find that there was no practical violation of the

right to privacy; and therefore, no need of the establishment of a rule of law that would give relief in case
of its infringement.

Then,in early timesthere were no

rules of law applying to railroads and telegraphs,
because there were no such existing occupations.

But

the readiriess, with which the common law was brought to

bear on these occupations;
a law/applicable to

and from its

broad pfrnciples

these nem industries was gradually

developed, leads us to reason that now that

the right

to privacy is violated, and finding so many reasons
protection,

for its

the common law will securely

pro-

tect it.
think the foregoing Oescription of theelasticity

I

to

and mobility of the common law would be sufficient

establish this right, but thence is another and fully
strong an argument in

its

.
s

favor.

Although there is only one decission, that holds in
terms that a pe-sort has this right to privacy, this
right

is

virtually

protection;

recognized by giving' injured party

but basing the re.soning on some

fiction

that has little to do with the justice of the case.
One instance of the protection
by permitting

lication.

the writer of letters

be pe-mitted

to enjoin their

pub-

A great deal of difficulty was experiencea

in getting the courts to recognize
saw that it

of this right is

wmas no more

than proper

this right.

They

that a person should

to enjoin the publication

of his letters;

but did not find at once upon what ground to grant the
desired protection.

Finally it was held to be a breech

of trustor confidence, that the writer reposed in the receiver.(Abernathy v. Hutchinuon, 3 L. J. Ch.,

229) It

was very difficult to see how the causs-J recipient of a
letter accepted any trust. (-larvard

Law Review, Vol. No.5,

p 201.)
This doctrine of the trust would not protect the
writer as regards third personswho should get conTrol
over the letter; so, finally, the courts adopted the fiction that the writer had

property right in the letters.

Some courts distinguished between literary letters, those
whichthe writter intended to publish for profit, anld
ordinary business or friendly letters; and one court refised to enjoin the public;tion of mere friendly letters,
because they were not of a literary character. ( Hoyt v.
Mackenzie, 2 Barb. Ch.'

220.)

hut at last Judge Story,

in Folsom v. liarsh,(2 Story; Myres Federal Decisions.)
said " that he was not prepared to admit of the soundness

or propriety of the supposed distinction between letters
of business(

or of a mere private or domestic character,

and letters which from thdir contents and character, are
treated as literary compositions. IDi the first case I

and his representa-

hold that the author of any letter
tives, whether they are

literary compositions, or familiar

letters of business, possesses the sole cnd exclusive
copyright; and that no person, neither thosE to whom they
are written, nor other persons have any right or authoriacccunt or for their

ty to publish them.upoir their cwi

own benefit. The generl property and the general rights
incident to yroperty, belong to the writer whether the
letters are literary coirnpositions,or familiar letters or
details of f:-cts or letters of business." It is very difficult to see what property a person can h-ve in a few
causal remarks, remarks that are reduced to writing,
remarks that he never intended to make any money by. It
is not the writing that is the subject of protection, but
the expressed thoughts; so it ought to -:ake no difference
whether the words are spoken or written, whether an act
or deed; ( Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV.,

No. 5, p.206.)

and it makes no difference whether they are of any pecuniary value or not,

If aperson has a right to keep

his expressions to himself, he ought to be allowed to
keep his acts and deeds secret.

I think it may be said,

that in these cases, it is simply th- right to privacy that
is recognized.

If the courts must base their decisions

on the right to property, they

02!

extend it to cover all

of property

a persons private dealings under the definition
given in

Andersons

TLav

Dictionary: propeo+.j

there

.is

defined as "that which is ones own, something which belongs
or inhers exclusi- ely to an individual person. In an
abstract sense, ownership, title, estate,
Property as thus defined

Pnd riiht."

, will includeevery right that

man has, but by the courts and by the common acceptation,
the term property is used in a reatricted sense. The
term property is used as applied to something, that a person can exchange and get value for; something that the
people as a moral and intellectual class desire;

something

that has a value pecuniarily, as recognized by good society, guided by a fair standard of morality. Why not confine
the term property to its generally accepted sense

and

thus do away with this technicality and fiction?
Another instance where the right has been recognized,
but under a fiction, is in the case of photokrapgy, Where
a photographer has,

at the request of a customer, taken

a negative of the customer aid then developed pictures
for his own benefit,;

the courts have implied a term into

the contract, namely, that the photographer shall make
only so many pictures as the customer shall order.(Pollard
v. Photographic Union, 40Ch. D. 345.)

In the case where the

person enters into a cortrac~with the r-hotographer and
consciously sits while the photographer takes a negative,
this implied term will give the person the desired prot

ection.

But how is

a

condition to be implied-when the

picture is taken surreptitiouslywhich prc.cess is rendered
very easy by modern appliances.

Does not the person

wronged merit protection just as much in the one case as
in the other? But if

the precedent that

is established,

is followed closely, the injured party will have no remedy
in the latter case. This, of course, is obviously unjust.
The practical way of giving the injured person the desired
protection, is to say that the policy of the people has
changed;

that the creation of new machinery and new invent-

ions, demands a broader and a different policy;
this

particular

and in

case, that the facility of taking pictures

surreptitiously, demands the recognition of the right
under its

proper head,-the riht

t.Lo privcy.

These two insta'nces heretofore stated are the most
prominent and best

illustrate the readiness of the courts

to protect this right and their position in basing their
recognition(on some fiction.

There are more cases in

which this right has been protectedby means of fictions;
but it

is

ur'necessary to state

them.

One court,

at

least

has come out

boldly

ani reco :riized

it the right

to privacy.

this righ;

and calleai

It was a Supreme Court of the

State of New York- the State that has been foremost in
perceiving injustice, and grantin
Schuyler v. Curtis ,

( 15 N.

a certain organization

Y.

rIief -

Supp. ,

The case is

787.)

in this case

of women haodetermined

that some

of the most prominent women in the United States should be
called attention to in the women's department of the
Worlds Fair;

so they procured funds sufficient to efrect

statues of some of the leading women.

They

finally

deter-

mined to hava statues made of Susan B. Anthony, entitled
"the modern women reformer",

and another of Mrs. Schuyler,

entitling it "the woman philanthropist".

Mrs. Schuyler,

during her life, had been very benevolent and had given
mut~h to alleviate the sufferings of the lower classes. She
was of a retiring disposition, disliking prominence of any
kind.

Her nephew, the plaintiff in this sui6, b-o,ght

acuion in the

inei'ests

fo_

an injuncion

of

,he statue of Mrs.

of the relatives

i'tsraining
Schuyler.

of Mrs.

Fhe

Schuyler,

The building and exhibitlon
The injunction was grant.-

ed on the ground that the relatives of Mrs. Schuyler had

a vxghi

to

she pzLivacy of her name and acts.

The court

in its decision states explicitly that this would violate

the right

to privacy,

and in

answer to the argument

that

it was against public policy,!aid, ir, substance, that they
could nct see how it violated public policy, that there was
no reascn why people should know that Mrs. Schuyler was
a philanthropist;

that the erection of her statue and its

public exhibition, would bring her name arid deeds into a
prominence, which both she and her suvivors disliked.

The

fact that it might be beneficial to her does not have anything to fo with the case.

Persons possess this right and

have the sole option to say whether they shall surrender
it or not.

Judge

Brown

cites

the article in the

Harvard Law Review with approbation, saying that everyone
ought to read

it

•

In early Limes,

in many cases, the only way the

courts could take cognizance of a new subject and grant
relief was by means of a fiction;

so

that, in those times

the fictions were of great valueto the people and in the
devolopment of the law.

But now, with

the creation of new

devises everyday, that are liable to interfere unduly with
the rights of some, it would be almost impossible
ufacture the

fictions necessary to give relief.

dency of the courts now is

to transact their

to manThe ten-

business on a

trying to secure

practical basis,

justice by a short

route and in the quickest possible manner.

In

,ords

other

the whole tendency of the courts is toward the so called
"law reform".

BeAring this in mind, it gives us confi-

dence that the courts will protect

this right properly.

Maines ideas of fictions.

I insert here Sir Henry

(Sir Henry Maine Ancient Law, p 26.)
He defines a"Legal Fiction"to signify any assumption which
conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of
law has undergone
ed,

its

alteration,

its

operation being modified.

lette"

It

remaining unchang
is

not difficult

to understand why fictions in all their forms are particu
larly

congenial

the desire

to the

infancy of society.

ahey satis

fy

for improvement, which is not quite wanting,

at the same time they do riot offend the superstitious
dislike

for change which is always present.

ular stage of social progress
dients

for overcomirg

At a partic

they are invaluable expe-

the rigidity

of the law •

We must,

therefore, not suffer ourselves to be affected by the
ridicule which Bentham pours on legal fictions whereever
he meets
betray

them. To revile them as merely
ignorance

al development

of their

of the law.

fraudulent

peculiar office
But at the same

in

is

to

the historic

time it

wo ld

those theorists, who,

be equally foolish to agree with
discovering

that

they ought to be stereotyped
their

day,

but it

of us to effect

had

huve

fictions

in

uses,

their

our system.

has long since gone by.

art

admittedly

a devicelas a legal fiction.

beneficial

argue

that

They have haa
It

is

unworthy

object by so rude

I cannot admit any anomaly

to be innocent, which makes the law either more difficult
to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious order.
V7ow legal fictions are the greatest obstacles
al classification.
systeri,

Therule

to symmetric

of law remains sticking in

the

but it is a mere shell, and a new rule hides itself

under its

cover.

Hence there

in knowing whether
should be

classed

its

and minds of different

lish law is ever

at once a difficulty

the rule which is actually operative
in

of the authorities

is

true or in

its

appacen.

casts will diff't'

p±Lce,

as to the branch

which ought to be selected.

If

the Eng-

to assume an orderly distribution, it

will be necessary to prune away the legal fictions which
in

spite of some recent

zxx xk
in

kx abundant

in

it."

legislutive

inprovement,,

Of course

which a person may not assert

are still

there are many cases

this right,

because,

there are others whose interests are effected. Salus

populi supremnblex is the maxim that will apply.
notable exception is
date

for such office.

The most

that of a public officer, or a candiAny person who holds or propose.s to

hold a public office, parts with many of his private rights
He becomes prominent;

he

is

scrutinized and criticized.

discussed;

his acts are

It is right and proper that

the people should know what sort of men are taking part
in their government, and how they are discharging their
The officers themselves are benefited.
duties.^ By the discussion and criticism, they learn
will of the people and can proceed accordingly.
merit of public policy would apply here

the

The argu-

in its strongest

sense.
There are also many cases in which a private person
may riot assert this right.

These are generally where the

person occupies a sort of quasi public position, depending on the patronage and custom of the people at large,

as

hotel-keepers, merchants, railroad officials, teachers,
lawyers, clergymen and the like.

In all these cases

connec ted
persons are more intieiately with the people at large
others

the
than

; and, to that extent, that which wouid be consid-

ered private in other cases, is surrendered
efit of the public.

for th e ben-

But in both the case of a public

officer and these other named persons, there is, of course

some limitation upon the intrusion into all their relations and dealings.
a candidate

in the case of a public officer or

for office,

the people would have a right to

know of his general appearance, his ability as a speaker,
his

former occupation, and the way in which he couducted

his business and the probabilities of his successfully
performing

the duties of the public office.

They would

not have a right to know every time he bought his wife a
presentto know the kind and value of it,

and any special

exhibition of affecti,.n.
This right of the people to know everything about
,

the person who holds a public office

or is about to

assume

the duties of one, is one that has every argument

in its

favor.

It

is

especially so

in

a republican

form of

government, where the officers are chosen from and by the
people;

chosen generally on account of their peculiar

ability

to perform satisfactorilly,

all

the duties that may

devolve upon themin the discharge of their trust.

in order

that the people ,nay be able to select those that will be
best able to participate in the management of public affairs, there must be discussion;

and, as many of the

people have never seen the officer or candidate, his
photograph may be taken and be circulated.

His private

business relations may be described , so that the people
may acquire

the requisite

information

necessary for

to make a wise selection of candidates, and,
determine

them

likewise to

the advisability of keeping the present incum-

bent in office.
In the case of othei' persons, riot properly entitled
to claim the full protection of this right, as hotel-keepers,

for example, the public h,:s

of their hotels,
the general

a right

to know the size

the number and arrangement of the rooms

facilities

for the accommodationand

comfort

of guests, and the manner of conducting the business.

Arid

so with a merchantbut itwould not be said that the landlord's or merchant's private roomkor house could be thus
described, that is,

the shape and size of the rooms and

the like.
And in

the case of an actor,

the public have a right

to know and discusq within proper liwits; his ating and
general appearance;the
al demeanor.

quality of his voice and his genier-

Clergyman, lawyers, public lectures, and the

like, also loose some of the

rights that they would ordi-

narily possess. It may be said that they are interesting
speakers,the quality of their voices,

their fluency etc may

be commented upon.
The general rule that may be formulated
various cases is:

from these

When a person depends on the patronage

of the public at large, and holds himself out as ready to
respond to any call that may be made upon him in his line
of business, the public has a right to know any fact or
th a t
quality directly affects his ability to discharge the duties that will devolve upon him in his general line of
business.

Of course all a persons acts and relations will

which
to some extent, affect the readiness with/a person will
select him to take charge of his own matters; but it is
qui~e obvious that the line must be drawn somewhere, so 1
have said,

"any matter that directly affects

his ability

etcW I do not want to draw a rigid ling,.but simply one
that is adOpted to common sense.

Every case willbe gove n

ed by its own peculiar features, but adoted from the

gen-

eral rule as far as possible.
Another exception is the necessar, disclosures of
private matters in courts of justice, to the legislature,
and to quasi public corporations.

This exception, as are

all the others, is due to the fact that the rights of
other people are affecteu; rights that are of more import-

ance

than the right

the right
only so
venient

to privacy.

must receivecarelful

But in all the'e ca es,

attention,

the only practically

far as necessary, and whe i
way of accomplishing

and be violated
cor

the desired object.

This right to privacy must be distinguished from
slander and libel ;

although

in their

means of vi(,lation

and nature of its accomplishment, they very closely resemble

with
this right, and might unthikingly be confounded it.

But the great distinguishing feature is that in slander
or libel some direct pecuniary interest is affected.

In

order that an action for slander or libel may be maintaine4

the person bringing

ed some pecuniary

loss.

the action must have sustain-

But as

in

other injuries

the injury has been maliciously donei
endured by the plaintiff,

where

the mental suffering

may be taken into consideration

as an element"punitivedamages.

In order to start the

machinery of the courts

the injury,

injured his reputation;

so as to prevent or restrict

in

some way,

must have
his

dealings with his fellow citizens, and causing them to
shun his society.
Having considered

the nature of this right,

and

the probability of its just enforcement and protection by

the courts, our next thought wili
In this,

be, what are the remedies

as in other cases of tort, there are two remedies;

the injunction,and

the action for damges.

The injunction, where it may be had, will be most
salutoryand will afford the most adequate r.iie;* and the
courts will not have so much abjection to it as
to the action
the

for damages.

In

they will

the case of an irnjurnction,

injured party can have full and complete reiieP and

accomplish his object, that is preventing the disclosure of
that which is private.
recognized in NewYork.

The relief

by injunction has been

( Schuyler v. Curtis,

But wherethe injury has been done,
ed,

ante)

the right violat-

it is ciear tat the person injured ought to have some

remedy.

The only one is the action for damages.

is where we have our difficulty,

And here

The action for damages,

in this case will be for injury to the

feelings, pure and

simple.
The courts of the different States are in great
confusion,
allowed.

as to when damages

for mental suffering may be

Owing to the confusion of the courts, and to the

importance of the law of damages in

connection with this

subject, I have determined to treat this branch of the law

somewhat

at length.

Some of the courts hold that in order to recover
injury to the feelings

for mental suffering, the

damages

must have been incident

to an injury to the person or prop-

erty and caused by the malice of the defendant,
it

( Green,*.

as punitive damages.

note;

Evid.,

regarding

Vol. 11.,

# 267,

Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Illinois R. R. Co. v.

Sutton, 53 Ill.,

227;

Wilson V. Young, 31 Wise.,

582.)

Other courts hold, that where there is physical
injuryand the mental suffering is connected with the physical injury, a recovery may be had for the mental suffering
but not alone

Willingstown, I Cush.
Co.,

15 N.

841;

Terra Uaute R. R

Fenny v.

Y.

L.

Vargo Co.,

( Canrnings V.

for mental suffering-.

4!5;

I.

R.

(Nev.)

452;

Oniel v.

R.

Co, v
Cc.,

Ranson v. N. Y.
Dry Dock Co.,
Brinker,

116 N.

Y.

6 Am. Rep. 245.)

! Erie P. R.

15 N.

Y.

Supp.

(1ndl 2C N.E.

375;

176;

Johnson v.Wellr

In addition to the

authorities enumerated above Woods Mayne on Damages, at pag
page 74 says:the

"So

far as I have been able to ascertain

force of the rule,

the mental suffering referred

to is

that which grows out of the sense of peril or the mental
agony at the

time of the happening of the accident,

and

incident and blended with the bodily pain

is

that which

injury,

incident to the
no case has

it

unaccompanied
sated fo-.

and anxiety

thereby induced,

but

in

ever been held that mental ang:ish alone
by an injury to the purson might be compen-

( See Cooley on Torts, page 271,to the same

effect) Thus the r1-le seemed to be well settled that in
order to recover for mental suffe'ring,

there must have

been some other actual damage.
This lack of a recovery for mental suffering mas
due

to the attidude of the Old common law judges. The

common law judges have ever since the earliest times had a
peculiar fear and dislike to deal with and to estimate the
happiness

of man,

mental operations.

to take

into corisiderat..on

his purely

This has evinced itself most strongly

in the law of damages; but it has also come up in other con
nections, in contracts
o f a gift for example,

, gifts and the like.

In the

case

no matter how much love, affect-

ion or gratitude one may have for another,
intimately he may be interested

in

no matter how

anothers welfare,

unless certain requisite formalities are gone through with
that is, delivery and acceptance, no valid gift can be made
The promise to give is unenforceable;

but if the other

person gives something tangible,
igant,

if

there

is

no undue

matter how insignif-

n

influerce,

the gift

will be

upheld.The position of the courts was due largely, at
first, to their inability to estimate

the happiness of man

to have any standard by which they might be guided.

This

once established by a case, was followed with slavish persistence.

It was greatly modified by introducing fictions,

so that the court, might say that they vere not awarding
damages
as

for mental suffering,

although in

reality

in the action for seduction, the fiction,

they N,,ere

'per quod

servitum amissit' is resorted to and damages awarded on
that basis, but in reality wholly for the injury to
feelings, pride, etc of the parent.
down to a short time
use of fictions,

the

This rule continued

al-o with various rnodificationsby

thc

but the courts alw.ays required pecuniu.,y

damage of some kirdeven if fictiticus.
By

the

introduction ol the te.iegraph a new way

of injuring the
feeling-s

in

feelings

this case

is

resulted.

announcing

ativeor near friens,
message

injury

to the

caused by the negligence

teleghaph company in delaying the
ery of a message

The

the

of the

transmission and deliv-

illne-

thus prevenrtinr

s or death of a
the receiver

from Ueing present during the last

moments

rel-

of the
or

attending

the funeral

of a friend or relative.

courts do not allow a r~-covecy
ferint-,

of damages

when caused by the negligence

All the
for mental

of the

suf-

6ellegraph

company in transmitting the message. Those courts which
have recognized the right to recover for mental angaish
thus caused have made a new rule, or a sort of new fiction,
that is, where th,2re is wrong done,

a legal right viola-

tod, then nominal damages may be allowed;
inal damages may be awarded,

danages

for injury

feeling may be granted. The fiction is
have changed

to the

-,

that aithough they

the rule and allow damages

ing unconnected

and where nom-

for mental

with an injury to the personi

suffer-

they profess

to keep within the rule and claim to have made no departure.

They allow damages for mental suffering that has no

connection with an injury to the person,
never done before.
the same time

and this

was

They resort to this fiction while at

they complain of the old fictions

of le

corn-

:ron law. The courts are conservative, never departing any
more than is necessary from the existing rules to accomplish the desired object in a case. Nearly all the State
courts, where this

question has arisen, have followed the

principles before stated.

They are

the Followirg;-

(Chapman v

Tel. Co.,

(Ky.) 13 S. 1Y.

86 Tenn.,395;
683;

Young v.

880;

;a,!oi. rth v. Tel. Co.,

Tel. Co.

(N. C.)

.2 Am.

St. Rep.,

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Anderson, (Ala. ) ldAm. "t.

Rep. ;

Western Union Tel. Co. v- Broesche, 72 Tex. 68V;

Reese v. Tel. Po.,

(Ind. ) 24 N. E. 153. ) The last named

case did riot adopt this fictioq but granted relief on the
broad ground of justice and reason.

In this case Judge

Terkshire said:- "Some of the authorities seek to draw a
distinction as to the right to recove' damages for mental
suffering, between cases where there may be a recovery
for pecuniary loss and cases where there is or can be no
pecuniary loss, to which case the present one belongs.
With this distinction , we have no sympathyg and confess
we can see no good reason for it to rest upon.

When a

te.ugraph company agrees to transmit arid deliver a message
promp.tly wherein dollars ans cents are alone involved, and
its negligence occasions loss it is conceded by all the
authorities that it may be compelled to respond in damages
Why? because it has been negligent, broken its agreement,
or, as sometimes said, failed to perform a d uty which it

oweb to the sender of the message or to the person to whom
addressed, as the case

nay be."

The position of the
ey

for mental suf fering,

though the

fiction

Nhic,

seem to be

a- propriate

courts in

allowing this

has many arguments
they have resorted

to the

in

its

recovfavor,

to does not

ref(.-m.

argumerit advanced by the jAdges in

The strongest
the cases that refuse

to a.low this recovery, is,

case upon case has held

to the same effect,

wil1 riot depart from the precedent
is

reason and some logic in

is

so vague,

definate arid apt to be so variable

arid that they

thus established. There

the argument

so purely metaphysical

that

and,
in

that the
herefore,

inj.4ry
so in-

different persons,

that the jury cannot estimate it with any degree of certainty, or have

any standard to go by- This same argu-

ment would apply to awarding damages for any physical
injury.

The jury cannot afvard damages

in

any case exactly

in proportion to the actual damage suffered.

The most

they can do is to try and do the right thingas nearly as
possible. Would an argument that because the jury might
bi-a little

wild in

ry be sustained for

assessing damages

for a physical inju-

- moment to refuse a recovery*

absurdity of the argument

in

The

connection with an injury to

the feelings is equally apparent, but in a less degree.

One judge in support of his position that damages for mental

suffering solely should not be awarded said:-

"

It

would open the doors to metaphysics, philosophy, and
physiology."
s.

c. 3 Am.

( Johnson v. We-iis Fargo & Co.,
Rep.,

245.)

Of course the

6 Nev. 224;

courts would have

to proceed differently have to admit a different kind of
testimony;

but it would be always to secure justice.

party claims t

be

injured;

to give him adequate

relief,

the rights of both parties.
court a little more

A

it is the duty of the court
always having due regar,

for

The fact that it wo,ild take a

time and be more difficult to ascer-

tain the precise rights of the parties is not a valid reason for refusing to take cognizance at all.

There

is no

case that is adjudicated where perfect justice is done-he plaintiff will either recover more of a compensation
than he deserves or less-

Even if the defendant may be

used a little harshly, is that any reason for letting the
plaintiff suffer withoutany compensation at all?

All that

can be done is to try and do exact justice as nearly as
possible
Itis also said, if suah damages were to be allowed,
it

would promote endless litigation

Wge do not claim that

injiry to the

every little

for ir, a court of lawa.

feeling:s should be compensated

The same rules would apply to this

class of actions as to every other.
if

a perso.

b'-ings an action in

York for sl-,. der,
recovers less

libel,

Take a specific case:

a court of record in

seduction

and the like,

New

arid

than fifLy dollars, he can only recover

costs equal to the amount of his verdict; and as the costs
kind are about ore hundred doilars,

in

an action of this

it

would not be a pvfitable suit.

The same provision for

actions to recover damages for mentai suffering could be a
made, that is, providing that they could only be brought
in a court of record, and if less than fifty dollars were
recovered the plaintiff would only be entitled to costs
equal to his verdict.
argument id

concerned,

So far as the endless litigation
that would have no more weight as

applied to,thee cases than to any tort or contract action
A person is discouraged from bringing suit for uny petty
injury.

I need not state how essential to mans well being
and prosperity is the state of ones mind;

that is all ad-

mitted, and the inconsistency of the courts in following
those old precedents , is shown, where they will allow

damages
same

in

one case arid refuse

time admit

that

the plaintiff

them in

another,

and at

the

has been injured in

both instances.

he principal being that if there is some

other injury to

rhe person or property, damages for mental

suffeving

may be awardedq

as I see. The courts in the

tmere fiction having no value
telegraph cases , as I have

before shown, have made still another refinement or advancement

, allowing damages

for mental

suffering when

nominal damages may be awarded.
Now in the violation of the right to privacy, the
person has been injured by another, because a legal right
has been violated, and is entitled to nominal damages at
least;

and following out the late refinement, his mental

anguish may be compensated for.

I would put it on the

Berkshire
broad ground, as Judge Xa&XIX in Reese v. Tel. Co.

inti-

mated, that, where a legal right has been violated, the
person injured has a right to such damages as he has suffered; but perhaps

it is well to keep within the authori-

ties when the same result is accomplished.

ON.

CONCLUSI

As

the world advance- man becomes more sensitive.

He is able to appreciate and enjoy matters that to the
savage wuuld seem utter folly and nonsense.
greater independence in himself;

He feels a

feels that there are cer-

tain things that should be known to himself and his only.
He desires a place of retreat where he can feel secure
from outside observation.

So as civilization advances

this right to privacy will become more and more important.
Its just protection and enforcement will depend on the attitude of the people toward it .
let

If they do not agitae i;;

its violation go on without any particular remon-

strance they cannot expect the law to justly protect it
For the law is in its nature passive.

It is in fact but

a resultant of the civilization and learning of the people.
While a man

is protected in all his business relations,

his property and person, will it be said that he can have
no protection from the gossip monger?

